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CHURCH-STATE RELATIONS IN SLOVAKIA - OCTOBER 1994
by Janice Broun
Janice Broun (Scottish Episcopal Church) is a prolific writer on Eastern European 
religious developments and a frequent contributor to REE. She visited Slovakia for the 
third time in September 1994, this time with the Dumfires and Galloway ACTS (All 
Christians in Scotland Together) ecumenical coach tour. This report is based on one to be 
published by La Nuova Europa (Seriate, Italy) and is published here with the author's 
permission. 
Church-state relations in Slovakia since the breakup of Czechoslovakia have proceed 
fairly smoothly. Despite the intensity of persecution of the Slovak Catholic Church, 
religious practice is far more widespread in Slovakia and socially acceptable. There is 
considerably more enthusiasm, activity and readiness for social outreach than in Czech 
churches. Institutional church life is now well established. All the clergy I questioned felt 
that religious freedom is now secure. 
Complete church-state separation and the cessation of subsidies for clergy stipends within 
four or five years is predicted. Subsidies for church reconstruction were suspended last 
year. Some church social work activity might continue to receive aid. Financial 
stringency reflects Slovakia's deteriorating economic situation; in the Visegrad 
Quadrilateral it has attracted only 4% of European investment. After the later Communist 
era in which it benefited from preferential treatment--on which Slovaks were never given 
the option of a referendum--Slovakia is drifting inexorably downwards into the East 
European Second Division. I will give a few examples of poverty. For forty years no 
church repairs were possible. Now, vast expenditure is needed, even to make churches 
safe. Parts of Kosice's Gothic Cathedral could crash down any day. The Catholic Church, 
which cannot afford to make it safe appealed to the government for help. All the 
government could do was to authorize a lottery. 
Our stay in Bratislava was organized by the Executive Council of Churches of Slovakia, 
by the Lutheran Peter Pavlovic. He had to travel by bus; he had no car. The Reformed 
Church, the second largest Protestant church, with 200,000 members, owns one car. Its 
clergy cannot support families without additional earnings from their wives. It has had to 
open a new theological college, at Komarno, because students can no longer afford what 
to them are exorbitant fees and living costs at Prague or Budapest. Finally, anyone who 
has eaten at the Orthodox Seminary in Presov can appreciate how close their food is to 
the fast-day diet. 
Restitution of church property has not proved the stumbling block it has been in the 
Czech Republic. Any problems in its implementation and that of other major spheres 
such as religious education in schools occur at the local and not the national level. 
Property Restitution
Cardinal Jan Korec held up Slovak property restitution as a model for Europe while 
Prime Minister Vladimir Meciar commended it as "an act of historical justice intended to 
express support for the churches in their efforts to promote Slovak spiritual and national 
renewal." 
Since Meciar's Movement for a Democratic Slovakia (MDS) has never enjoyed an 
absolute majority, his government could not afford to antagonize the churches, which are 
more strongly rooted in traditionalist Slovakia than among the more secularist Czechs. 
Around 70% of Slovaks are Catholic, and although Protestants are a minority, as in the 
Czech Republic, they have traditionally exerted a political and economic influence out of 
proportion to their size. The Slovak cut off dates for religious property restitution, 
November 2, 1938, for Jewish and May 8, 1945, for Christian communities have not 
posed any problems, in contrast with the Czech cut off date. That one, February 15, 1948, 
was determined by Czech refusal to restore Sudeten German property. 
The Catholic Bishops stressed that the church was not seeking its former wealth and 
power, only to ensure economic self-sufficiency. They promised that the Church would 
immediately turn over restored property for charitable purposes and thus return them to 
public use, leaving any surplus buildings to state ownership. Two of the reopened 
seminaries I visited had been reconverted from security police institutions. 
The law of October 27, 1993, was broadly acceptable to ten out of the fifteen Slovak 
religious communities. Some Protestant churches expressed reservations about it. Pavel 
Uhorskai, Lutheran Presiding Bishop, pointed out that confiscation had depreciated 
values and that some former church properties had already been sold off under 
privatization without church permission. 
The Jewish remnant of four thousand, however, (89,000 in 1940) felt that the three 
hundred properties they stood to regain would guarantee them financial independence. 
The law was supported by the strongly Catholic Christian Democratic Movement (CDM), 
the Slovak National Party, and the Hungarian Democratic Movement. Only the Party of 
the Democratic Left, the former Communists, opposed it. Unlike the Czech settlement, it 
includes farmland, forests, and estates, which cover 1% of Slovak territory. Only land 
now occupied by state hospitals, social service institutions, and schools is exempt. 
President Michal Kovac, a former Communist who impresses Christians by his honesty 
and commitment to represent the interests of all Slovaks, intervened to get Parliament to 
amend the bill on constitutional grounds. 
Church Schools and Religious Education
Church schools were closed in 1944 by the Slovak National Uprising's Revolutionary 
Committee, in reaction against President Jozef Tiso's attempt to establish a Catholic 
theocracy. Under Communism, religious instruction in schools by clergy had been 
possible but had such dire consequences on the child's educational and career prospects 
that only very devout parents opted for it. "So we produced nice semi-theologians," said 
Fr. Anton Shrolec, formerly one of the Catholic underground's outstanding priests, the 
only Catholic priest to man the barricades during Bratislava's Velvet Revolution, a radical 
now at odds with his hierarchy. Discrimination against future Catholic priests also existed 
with all seminaries except Bratislava closed and no university graduates admitted. 
Protestants of all churches had to train together in Bratislava or Prague. 
Now the churches are busy trying to make up for the lack of adequately educated and 
pedagogically qualified clergy and catechists. Catholic seminaries at Spis, Banska 
Bistrica, Trnava, Nitra, Presov and, this autumn, Kosice have been re-opened to meet the 
new needs and cope with the backlog of frustrated vocations. 
Eleven denominations sought the return of 910 schools of which 673 are Catholic. Over a 
hundred, at every level, have now been re-opened though not without opposition from 
Communists in some places. Some schools, like the Bratislava bilingual English-Slovak 
Lutheran Gymnasium, are prestigious institutions providing the highest standards for 
students from all over Slovakia for nominal fees. This and the Reformed Church School 
in Kosice are open to other Protestants. "In such big projects it is better to develop 
ecumenical thinking and cooperation," Pavlovic commented. 
Courses in religion or ethics were re-introduced into the school syllabus last year, though 
they are not yet mandatory during the first four years. Some primary school heads insist 
on a minimum of 35 pupils for such courses. Recruiting ethics teachers from the ranks of 
former teachers of atheist materialism or Russian language has not been difficult. An 
interesting new development is the participation of mature and competent Catholics as 
trainers for some ethics courses. 
Twice as many children choose religion rather than ethics; though at secondary level, 
nationwide, 6,000 more pupils prefer ethics to religion. 
Considerable regional variations reflect different levels of religiosity. In urban areas and 
the deeply secularized south, ethics are preferred. Bartolomej Gooz, General Secretary of 
the Reformed Church which is strongest in the area near the Hungarian border told me, 
"In our villages, parents are divided 50/50. They aren't sure that the Communist regime 
will not return so they think it's safer for the child to take ethics, despite our assurances." 
In the north and east, parents do not have such fears and most children receive religious 
instruction. 
Eastern Rite Catholics Versus Orthodox
Bitter relations between Greek Catholic and Orthodox Churches in Eastern Slovakia is 
perhaps the most intractable problem inherited form Communist interference. Many 
members of these churches are Ruthenian (Ukrainians who are culturally distinct from 
Ukrainians in Ukraine through their having been under Hapsburg rule). Because of the 
adverse connotations of being Ukrainian under Communism, most claim to be Slovak. 
In autumn 1994 twenty Catholic churches and presbyteries were still in Orthodox hands. 
Officially 38,000 people have chosen to remain Orthodox. Fr. Milan Gherka puts the 
number at nearer 60,000. He told me that in July, police were brought in to Sukov village 
to enforce the law. In another village, Jarabina, where there are no documents proving it 
belonged to the Catholics the mayor closed the church. The Orthodox who have 400 
families there recovered it but are now expecting an attack from the 80 local Catholic 
families backed by Catholics from other villages. 
The Greek Catholic Church , thanks to its resistance to persecution is flourishing and its 
more educated members are anxious for dialogue with the Orthodox so as to out the past 
behind them. I got the impression that Protestants sympathize with the plight of the 
Orthodox, who were deprived of all the churches they had gained under Communism 
under the new Catholic-influenced law of 1990. "This dispute was created by 
Communism," said Pavlovic. 
Interchurch Relations
Most churches are prepared to cooperate, Pavlovic said. 
Our big problem is how to tackle our Communist heritage and we are not yet clear how 
this should be done. The Ecumenical Council has six full and four associate members. It 
is very important that the Roman Catholic Church participates as an observer. As a result 
of our complicated history, there is a big gap between them and the Protestant minority; 
Lutherans are the next largest church with 7 to 8%, the Reformed church next. At the end 
of the sixteenth century, 90% of SLovaks were Protestant but the Counter Reformation, 
with killings and forcing people into slavery almost eliminated Protestantism. It is not so 
easy to develop dialogue and cooperation with this history. Under Communism it wasn't 
possible to develop any relationships. The most important thing was to survive. Now we 
have to discover a modus vivendi." 
They are cooperating well in the Ecumenical Council; at the local level, they have more 
to learn. 
The Churches, Politics and the Minorities
Informed Czechs I met in 1993 felt that the Slovak Catholic bishops shared a 
considerable part of the blame for the breakup of Czechoslovakia. They said the bishops 
had overemphasized Slovak national identity and, in a simplistic way, trusted Meciar's 
unrealizable pledges to maintain the same level of employment as under Communism and 
to keep the social services intact. In Prague, Fr. Vaclav Maly, former Charter 77 
spokesperson, admitted great disappointment in their failure to distance themselves from 
the government. Another Czech, Dr. Oto Madr, a leading theologian of the underground, 
now editor of Teologicke Texty, a participant in twice-yearly confidential meetings with 
Slovak bishops and Catholic politicians, commented "with us, they are critical, but they 
lack the courage to speak out openly against the government." A former Federal 
Parliament deputy accused them of naivety in their aim of realizing Christ's kingdom on 
earth, by hoping for a reintroduction of a theocracy like Tiso's. Tiso remains a stumbling 
block in relations between Catholics and Protestants, who played a prominent role in the 
Slovak National Uprising against the Nazis. On the ecumenical level, a re-examination of 
his role and informed discussion is urgently needed. 
In contrast, Protestants from mainstream churches strongly opposed the split of 
Czechoslovakia. Evangelicals like Baptists and Pentecostalists prefer to steer clear of 
politics. 
Gooz, a Hungarian, feels that allowances must be made for the Slovaks; "We must try to 
understand how they are trying to discover their own identity after a thousand years of 
being ruled by other nationalities." 
Although a keen Christian Democratic Movement supporter and friend of former 
President of Slovakia and the Christian Democratic Movement leader, Jan Carnogursky, 
Srholec is critical of its naivety and failure to distinguish between religion and politics. It 
has little in common with other European Christian Democratic parties. Under 
Communism, Slovaks had been isolated from surreptitious Western contacts. Charter 77 
hardly gained a foothold, Carnogursky being the exception. The opposition to 
Communism was virtually the Catholic Church which built up a superbly organized 
underground. "Deprivation of the vital civic dimension handicaps Slovak Catholic 
adjustment to democracy and pluralism," Srholec argues. "For forty years Christians were 
deprived of access to higher education, technology, science, and the economy. Compared 
with the Communists and other parties, we are dilettantes. Although the Christian 
Democratic Movement includes respected Protestant leaders, its image is so Catholic, 
ultra pious and conservative that it alienates most Protestants." He felt the Christian 
Democratic Movement needed to become a more broadly based Christian party with its 
priorities democracy and national unity. 
The Catholic Church, he feels, concentrated too much on the sacraments, "not on training 
and teaching Christians to understand what it is to be a Christian in the world. Thus, 
despite its numerical strength, it exerts little influence on political, economic or cultural 
life." He commends Protestants as more ready to send lay members for training in the 
West and to give them responsibility. Our ACTS group members who visited Protestant 
churches in Bratislava, however, found them very conservative liturgically. Fergus 
McPherson, our ebullient Presbyterian minister, caused a sensation by arousing laughter 
in his sermon. Two Slovak boys who had come back with us, after attending a Scripture 
Union camp on Arran, commented that they had never before known laughter in a Slovak 
church service. 
Srholec berated his episcopate for its failure to support Carnogursky, especially in view 
of the spiteful denigration he suffers from Meciar, "who has a mind like a computer. As a 
Soviet-trained Communist, Meciar seeks to bring us back into the Russian sphere of 
influence." He felt that the bishops' letter before the elections should have spelt out more 
clearly the Christian duty to support Christian democracy. 
Although none of those I interviewed felt that religion would be endangered by Meciar, 
all but the Orthodox deplored the gullibility of the many simplistic Christians who 
succumbed to his charisma. They were ashamed of the reputation he had gained for 
Slovakia, of his government's failure to address its basic industrial and economic 
problems. 
In December 1993, Carnogursky and leaders of various religious, political, and cultural 
groups joined with President Kovac in criticizing Meciar following a controversial 
(leaked) speech to Communist activists in which he threatened to crush internal 
opposition when the time is ripe. Civic Democratic Youth accused him of resorting to 
"political practices used by Communist regimes." From independent sources, I learned of 
continued security monitoring and interception of mail and fax of Christian doctors, both 
Catholic and Protestant. 
In March 1994, Meciar was forced to resign by Kovac and his ministers, only to re-
emerge as victor, with 35% of the vote in the October elections. The electoral bloc led by 
former Communists, Common Choice, finished a poor second with 10.4%, the Hungarian 
group third at 10.2%. The Christian Democratic Movement did better than expected, 
coming fourth at 10.1%. Responsible Christians fear that Meciar will take revenge on 
Kovac, who refused to be his stooge, by putting pressure on Parliament to replace him. 
Slovaks have co-existed peacefully for centuries alongside Czechs, Germans, 
Hungarians, Ruthenians, and Jews, but with independence it inherited almost all the 
minorities. With two glaring exceptions, the status of minorities is satisfactory. 
Fr. Srholec, who is engaged in a flourishing Jewish-Christian dialogue, feels that the Jews 
are under no threat. Among positive and sensible steps taken by Josef Moravcik's interim 
coalition government which followed Meciar's downfall in spring was the invitation of 
prominent Israelis to the celebration connected with the Slovak National Uprising. 
Government representatives were able to show that many Slovaks received awards for 
saving Jews. Srholec, who is also Vice President of the Slovak Helsinki Monitoring 
Committee, has close Jewish contacts and has visited Israel along with his friend Vaclav 
Maly. He maintains that the Slovak record of protecting Jews is better than that of the 
Czechs, Poles, or Hungarians, that the Slovak anti-Semitism was socio-economic rather 
than cultural in origin and is now confined to old people and a few skinheads. 
The 600,000 Hungarians and 400,000 Romany have served as convenient scapegoats for 
Meciar's government failures and responsible church people are deeply disturbed by the 
implications of Meciar's vote-catching xenophobia. 
The Communists, fearing the Hungarians, granted them a privileged minority status with 
their own newspapers, schools, and access to the media. Meciar's government 
systematically eroded this. Hungarian signs were removed; Slav names and suffixes were 
made compulsory for birth registrations and women's surnames; local government 
boundaries were redrawn into narrow north-south regions which put the Hungarians in a 
minority in every area, although along the southern frontier they constitute 80 to 90% of 
the population. Increasing insecurity has reinforced the Hungarian demands for 
autonomy. Meciar, adept at playing on popular feelings, compares them unfavorably with 
other minorities; "they alone are struggling for collective not civil rights," he said in a 
pre-election speech. "Hungarians don't have Slovak hearts. In our south, Slovaks feel like 
foreigners." 
Slovakia's minority policy has failed to meet European standards except during the 
interim government which made positive sensible moves to reduce tensions between 
Slovaks and Hungarians. Over the border, Gyula Horn's new Hungarian government 
opened by reaffirming Hungary's respect for existing boundaries. All this progress could 
be reversed under the next Slovak government. The fact that the three Hungarian 
coalition parties picked up 10.2% of the vote, reflecting their proportion in the 
population, reveals their fears. 
Although the Hungarian border region is the most secularized region of Slovakia, the 
Reformed Church is largely, and the Catholic and Lutheran Churches partially, 
Hungarian. Thus they experience the practical problems of bilingual congregations. 
Hungarian Catholics have demanded a bishop of their own nationality. These demands 
were rejected by the bishop with responsibility for Hungarians, Trnava's assistant bishop, 
Mgr. Dominik Hrusovsky. His reasons--that Hungarians do not provide sufficient 
Catholic babies and that their priests have a bad record of moral lapses--were not such to 
endear him to his flock. Difficulties do arise where the clergy person speaks only Slovak. 
In Komarno, where the Lutheran minister Radko comes into this category the Reformed 
Church loan a minister to preach a Magyar sermon once a month. Gooz believes that had 
it been left to the Communist party separate Hungarian churches would probably have 
been liquidated before 1989. He gave the far more intelligent Secret Police the credit 
having eased pressures on them. 
The Romany are quite another problem. Deeply divided, often unemployed, tossed back 
and forth by local authorities in both republics, though, thanks to Communist policies of 
integration, they are not as disadvantaged as Roma further east. I heard allegations of 
continued sterilization of women after giving birth, without their knowledge or consent. 
There is no doubt that many communities feel threatened by them and are very much on 
their guard. Again, churches need to give clear guidelines and to be ready to defend the 
rights of Romanies if necessary. Nominally they are Catholic. Individual Christians are 
working among them, though it is a demanding and specialized ministry. Greek Catholic 
theology lecturer Fr. Georgi Novotny has Roma among his students and told of a Roma 
nun who works among her community in Presov but deplores the unwillingness of well-
heeled Roma to fund social work. 
A priority for the churches will be to counteract politicians who try to inflame national 
tensions and make the Christian viewpoint clear in the coming months. The increase in 
the Christian Democratic Movement vote--4% higher than the estimate of my Czech 
political friend--indicates that an increasing number of Christians are ready to support 
democracy. 
It took Meciar over two months of near stalemate to form a government, but he already 
has control of state radio, television, and Security and has cancelled 55 of the previous 
government's privatization projects. The only partners he could find are extremist, the far 
right Slovak National Party and far left Slovak Workers Party, which is run by a near 
illiterate, advocates state control over almost all spheres of life is opposed to the 
European Union, NATO and the International Monetary Fund. Gooz had commented: "I 
only hope he has to rule with a coalition of other parties." He will not be very happy 
about this coalition. Fr. Srholec writes, "The struggle for democracy is not yet finished." 
 
